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the lens of social construction. I begin by comparing the efforts to quantitatively measure the plague in 
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facts are social constructions; (2) measuring involves making decisions, (3) counting is not 
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Introduction: The View from 1665 
 
The opening pages of Daniel Defoe’s (1968 [1722]) A Journal of the Plague Year 
should seem familiar to readers in 2020.1 The book begins in December 1664, 
when Londoners were trying to figure out just what was happening. The plague 
had struck Holland in 1663 and 1664; now two men were reported dead from the 
disease in London. Would those be the only cases, or would there be more?  
People turned to the weekly Bills of Mortality (an accounting kept by the 
Worshipful Company of Parish Clerks), which were supposed to track burials in 
London: 
 
. . . the usual Number of Burials in a Week, in the Parishs of St Giles’s in the Fields, and 
St Andrew’s Holburn, were from 12 to 17 or 19 each, a few more or less; but from the 
Time that the Plague first began in St Giles’s Parish, it was observ’d, that the ordinary 
Burials encreased in Number considerably. For Example, . . . 
 
Jan. 30 to Feb. 7   St Giles’s 21 
    St Andrew’s  23 
Feb. 7 to 14   St. Giles’s 24      (p. 3) 
 
The usual Number of Burials [for the whole of London] within the Bills of Mortality for a 
Week, was from about 240 or thereabouts, to 300.  The last was esteem’d a pretty high 
Bill; but after this we found the Bills successively encreasing, as follows: 
          Buried    Increased 
Dec. the 20th to the 27th     291 
    27 to the 3 Jan.   349    85 
January 3 to the 10  394    45 
    10 to the 17      415    21 
    17 to the 24      474    59      (p.  4) 
 
So more people were dying, but were these deaths from plague? Relative few 
deaths were ascribed to that cause, but “. . . it began to be suspected, that the 
Plague was among the People at that end of the Town; and that many had died of 
it, tho’ they had taken Care to keep it as much from the Knowledge of the Publick, 
as possible . . .” (2). There were competing diagnoses: in the week of April 18–25 
“there was buried in St Giles’s Parish 30, whereof two of the Plague, and 8 of the 
Spotted-Feaver, which was looked upon as the same thing . . .” (5).  Eventually, 
efforts to obtain more accurate counts emerged: during May 23–30:   “. . . the 
Burials in St Giles’s were 53, a frightful Number! of whom they set down but 9 of 
the Plague: But on an Examination more strictly by the Justices of the Peace, and 
                                                          
1 Defoe was a small child in 1665.  He would have grown up listening to accounts of people who 
had vivid recollections of the plague, but his book, much like his better-known Robinson Crusoe 
and Moll Flanders, is a fictional account told in the first person. 
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at the Lord Mayor’s Request, it was found there were 20 more, who were really 
dead of the Plague in that Parish, but had been set down of the Spotted-Feaver or 
other Distempers, besides others concealed” (6).2  
These passages indicate that, when faced with a serious but uncertain threat, 
seventeenth-century Londoners made efforts to quantitatively measure what was 
happening. In other words, Defoe’s book—written fifty years before the word 
statistic was coined—describes the social construction of statistics.3 
These dynamics seem strikingly familiar, even though Defoe was describing 
events more than 350 years ago. It is easy to assume that our situation ought to be 
very different from that of seventeenth-century London. After all, (1) we have a 
vastly improved medical system founded on a completely different and vastly 
superior understanding of disease, with better trained professionals, more accurate 
diagnoses, and more effective treatments; (2) we have a vastly more sophisticated 
public health system to trace and control the spread of epidemics; (3) we have 
vastly more scientific knowledge, as well as institutions to foster its growth and 
spread; and (4) we have vastly more effective means of communication to spread 
information. And yet, much like Defoe’s Londoners, we find ourselves in the early 
stages of an epidemic, struggling to use numbers to make sense of what’s 
occurring. 
In spite of the obvious differences between then and now, we can see the 
similarities. I started writing this during the second half of April 2020, when 
COVID-19 coverage preoccupied a large share of the news media’s attention. 
When I began writing, infections in the US had not yet peaked, and there were 
bitter debates about the nature of the threat and the best policies to address it. 
There seemed to be troubling trade-offs between the public health officials’ 
recommendations to maintain social distancing in order to minimize infections 
and deaths, and the need to restore an economy which had been terribly damaged 
as a consequence of those recommendations. (Defoe’s narrator, a sadler, faced this 
dilemma at an individual level: “I had two important things before me; the one 
was the carrying on my Business and Shop; which was considerable; and the other 
was the Preservation of my Life in so dismal a Calamity . . . which however great 
it was, my Fears perhaps as well as other Peoples, represented to be much greater 
than it could be” [9].)   
Obviously, mine is a preliminary account—notes for a rough draft if you will.  
Our understanding of the COVID-19 pandemic will evolve during the coming 
                                                          
2 The diarist Samuel Pepys also lived through the 1665 plague: “At the end of August, he cited the 
bill of mortality as having recorded 6,102 victims of the plague, but feared ‘that the true number of 
the dead this week is near 10,000,’ mostly because the victims among the urban poor weren’t 
counted” (Lotz-Heumann 2020). 
3 On the social construction of statistics, see Best (2004; 2008; 2012). 
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weeks, months, and years. I also need to make it clear that I have no training or 
background in epidemiology; I am just a sociologist who studies social problems 
by focusing on how people talk about public issues. Therefore, I am not going to 
reference the rapidly growing medical literature on COVID-19; rather, I am 
interested in exploring how the pandemic was discussed in public forums—in 
news coverage and various online posts. I have ignored the fleeting whims of 
social media and the noise from television’s talking heads, in favor of better 
thought-out, more coherent written statements. Still, examining how people talked 
about COVID-19 during the early months of 2020 allows us to identify facets of 
this topic that are relevant to those interested in numeracy. I present these as a list 
of observations. 
 
Facts Are Social Constructions 
 
Many of us had a third-grade social studies unit on facts and opinions, wherein we 
learned that facts are really, indisputably true, whereas opinions are statements 
that some people may consider to be true, even as other people disagree. Thus, 
“three times three equals nine” is a fact, while “Superman is the best superhero” is 
an opinion. However straightforward this may seem to third-graders, things are a 
bit more complicated than that. 
It is not difficult to find people who consider it a fact that the Bible is the one 
true word of God, and others who consider it a fact that the Koran is the one true 
word of God. Let’s remember that this dispute is not some minor disagreement; it 
is the root cause of many, many people being killed over centuries. This example 
tells us that facts are products of particular social groupings at particular times and 
in particular places. When I went to school, I learned it was a fact that our solar 
system had nine planets; my grandchildren are learning the fact that there are only 
eight. Labeling something a fact always occurs within a particular social context. 
Understand that I am not suggesting that all claims are equally true or some 
relativistic nonsense of that sort, but different groups have standards for 
determining what is factual. Scientists demand empirical evidence to weigh 
claims, just as historians have standards for judging evidence from the past, and 
theologians for correctly reading holy writ. Thanks to the Enlightenment, our 
world shares considerable consensus about lots of facts: most people accept that 
matter is composed of atoms, the earth orbits the sun, the continents are in motion, 
and so on—and yet we know that these were once ideas that were seen as dubious. 
Where there is overwhelming evidence, we may think it very unlikely that 
knowledge we currently consider factual will ever be overturned. At the same 
time, we have to acknowledge that knowledge that we may be confident is factual 
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(e.g., I—and most of the people I know—don’t doubt that evolution is a fact), 
continues to be disputed in other social settings. 
All of this is relevant in a world where some people denounce “fake news” or 
defend “alternative facts,” even as others pound the table and insist that the facts 
are on their side. Declaring that something is a fact hardly guarantees that debate 
will disappear, and often people on opposing sides of a debate insist that their 
views are the ones actually founded on facts. 
 
Measuring Involves Making Decisions 
 
When numbers appear in discussions of public issues and public policy, they 
almost always involve attempts to measure what is occurring. We are used to 
reifying these numbers; we talk about the crime rate or the unemployment rate as 
though they are straightforward facts, accurate statements about the amount of 
crime or unemployment. In so doing, we tend to gloss over the rather messy 
procedures used to create those numbers. Assume we want to measure the extent 
of crime. Before we can count crimes, we must first define just what we will 
consider criminal. Notice that many crimes are hidden because people try to 
conceal the crimes they commit, and we lack any sort of platform from which we 
can omnisciently identify every crime that has occurred. The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (the agency that calculates the crime rate) gets around this problem 
by surveying local law enforcement agencies and asking them how many 
instances of particular crimes (such as criminal homicide and forcible rape) in 
their jurisdiction came to their attention during the previous month. In other 
words, the crime rate is actually the rate of crimes known to the police, and there 
are other issues: not all law enforcement agencies report their data to the FBI, 
there are occasional scandals revealing that an agency has deliberately 
underreported crimes, and so on. 
Every effort to measure social conditions has analogous limitations.4 A long 
series of choices shapes whatever is being counted and how the counting occurs.  
When we talk about the resulting numbers as facts (e.g., equating the crime rate 
with the amount of crime), we ignore the very real processes by which those 
numbers are socially constructed, and the inevitable flaws and limitations in the 
results. 
In the case of COVID-19, measurement choices are complex. News coverage 
tends to highlight two sorts of statistics: the numbers of cases, and the numbers of 
                                                          
4 There are large social science literatures discussing the limitations that lead to inaccuracies in 
crime rates, unemployment rates, the census, and so on. For an introduction to some of these 
issues, see Nagaraja (2020). 
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deaths. Alas, neither of these is at all straightforward. Koerth et al. (2020) offer a 
basic formula for calculating the number of deaths from COVID-19:   
 
size of susceptible population x infection rate x fatality rate = total deaths 
 
However, this formula is deceptively simple.  There is evidence that 
susceptibility varies wildly by age, gender, social class, and individual health 
factors, so that any effort to measure the susceptible population must weigh the 
proportion of people in different risk groups. The infection rate is and will remain 
uncertain until effective, systematic testing methods are available; while people 
who exhibit the most severe symptoms are likely to seek medical care and be 
noticed, other infected people may have moderate or mild symptoms—or no 
symptoms at all.  And until we have a clear sense of the infection rate, it will be 
impossible to calculate an accurate fatality rate. 
Early attempts to measure the disease tended to involve small-scale, localized 
studies (on a cruise ship or in a city or some other geographic area), and these led 
to very different estimates for both infection rates and fatality rates: 
 
The data on Covid-19 differs wildly from country to country. Look at the figures for Italy 
and Germany. At the time of writing, Italy has 69,176 recorded cases and 6,820 deaths, a 
rate of 9.9 per cent. Germany has 32,986 cases and 157 deaths, a rate of 0.5 per cent. Do 
we think that the strain of virus is so different in these nearby countries as to virtually 
represent different diseases? Or that the populations are so different in their susceptibility 
to the virus that the death rate can vary more than twentyfold? If not, we ought to suspect 
systematic error, that the Covid-19 data we are seeing from different countries is not 
directly comparable. Look at other rates: Spain 7.1 per cent, US 1.3 per cent, Switzerland 
1.3 per cent, France 4.3 per cent, South Korea 1.3 per cent, Iran 7.8 per cent (Lee 2020a). 
 
Undoubtedly this discrepancy will all get sorted out over time, but in the short 
run, measurements have produced limited and contradictory information.  This is 
important because efforts to model the course of the disease inevitably require 
plugging best-guess estimates of these various factors into their formulas; 
depending on which estimates are chosen, the models’ forecasts can be very 
different, and they can change from day to day as new data become available.5 
 
                                                          
5 The COVID Projections Tracker (2020) is an online tool that makes the day-to-day changes in 
model projections visible. For instance, at the time I wrote this paper, the University of 
Washington’s Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (the IHME, whose model was frequently 
cited by the media) projections for the death toll had ranged from 60,307 (on April 16) to 93,762 
(on March 31). As states began relaxing their social distancing earlier than public health officials 
recommended, the IHME estimates rose markedly. See also Best and Boice (2020). 
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Counting Is Not Straightforward 
 
Precisely because so much about COVID-19 is unknown, the most authoritative 
numbers tend to come from the records kept by established bureaucracies, in 
particular, medical records and death records. These records are health-system 
choke points even in normal, non-pandemic times; that is, it is relatively easy to 
get fairly accurate counts of the cases that appear at these points in the system. At 
least in theory, everyone who becomes very sick should wind up seeing a doctor 
and being admitted to a hospital (institutions that keep records), and all fatalities 
should be recorded in death certificates. This reasoning is why the news media 
focus on the number of cases (i.e., the number of people being treated for COVID-
19, which, in practice, means the number who have been admitted to hospitals) 
and the number of deaths attributed to the disease. (Things haven’t changed all 
that much: recall Defoe describing Londoners relying on the bills of mortality’s 
burial records to track the plague’s spread.) At first glance, depending on the 
number of cases and the number of fatalities might seem commonsensical, but any 
time we count anything, we are inevitably forced to choose—to decide what to 
count and how to go about counting (Stone, in press).   
So what is a COVID-19 case? In many places, being counted as a case 
requires being admitted to a hospital, tested, and identified as someone infected by 
COVID-19. Defining cases this way is bureaucratically convenient: we 
presumably know how many hospitals there are, we can arrange for them to 
cooperate in reporting the cases they identify, and the people who are to be 
counted arrive on site. The problem is that counting patients in hospitals 
inevitably undercounts the actual number of cases. We know that many people 
infected with COVID are asymptomatic; that is, they have the virus but not the 
disease. Others have mild or moderate cases; they feel sick, even quite sick, but 
are discouraged from seeking hospital care unless they experience serious 
difficulty breathing. Still others—particularly in the US—may be very sick but 
lack health insurance, so are reluctant to present themselves for treatment. 
All of this means that using the number of patients in hospitals to count cases 
will severely underestimate the extent of the problem. The solution—and there is 
widespread agreement on this point—is to have testing programs that can identify 
infected people so they can be isolated before they infect others. The problem is 
that tests have been in short supply, causing different localities to adopt different 
procedures for deciding who gets tests, which in turn affects the numbers of cases 
identified (Silver 2020). Without widespread testing using a standard protocol, the 
numbers of cases reported are likely to undercount the extent of the disease.6 
                                                          
6 Because testing covers only small, usually nonrandom samples, there are efforts to devise more 
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What, exactly, is a COVID-19 death? We may imagine a case—call him 
“Adam”—who gets very sick, is tested, and is found to be infected with COVID-
19. He is admitted to the hospital, succumbs, and winds up with a death certificate 
that lists COVID-19 as the cause of death. Adam’s case represents the 
circumstances that are most likely to be accurately counted. But what about Betty 
and Carl, both residents in nursing homes who have long lists of serious chronic 
health problems such that they are already near death, and who become infected 
with COVID-19? Perhaps Betty’s death certificate mentions COVID-19, but 
Carl’s does not (Perls 2020). And what about Doris and Edward, elderly people 
living alone who become infected and are discovered dead in their homes—
perhaps Doris’s body is tested and the death is attributed to COVID-19, while 
Edward’s death is assigned some other cause? And so on. These examples suggest 
that COVID-19 death tolls are almost certainly undercounts (Koerth 2020), just as 
the crime rate inevitably undercounts the actual number of crimes. 
At the same time, it is also possible for overcounting to occur. Perhaps a 
hospital’s deaths are accidentally counted twice in tallying total deaths in a state, 
or: 
 
Consider some examples: an 87-year-old woman with dementia in a nursing home; a 79-
year-old man with metastatic bladder cancer; a 29-year-old man with leukaemia treated 
with chemotherapy; a 46-year-old woman with motor neurone disease for 2 years. All 
develop chest infections and die. All test positive for Covid-19. Yet all were vulnerable to 
death by chest infection from any infective cause (including the flu). Covid-19 might have 
been the final straw, but it has not caused their deaths (Lee 2020b).7 
 
Common sense tells us that death is an absolute, something that seems like it 
ought to be easy to count, but every count depends on the choices made. Even if a 
bureaucracy establishes a clear definition of what counts as a COVID-19 death 
and a set of procedures that ensures that definition is implemented in a thorough 
and evenhanded manner, there is no reason to assume that the authorities in other 
jurisdictions will use the same definition or procedures (Brown et al. 2020). 
Moreover, as concern about an epidemic increases over time, the definitions and 
procedures for recording deaths often change, making it difficult to compare 
counts across time. 
So far, I have been arguing that even people of good will can mess up 
counting. Beyond that, there are cases of intentional underreporting, attempts to 
disguise how bad things are.  The most glaring example involves China, where 
                                                                                                                                                              
representative methods, such as sampling DNA samples from wastewater and determining which 
proportion show evidence of the disease (Chakradhar 2020). Kaplow (2020) is an example of calls 
for randomized testing. 
7 The numeracy literature tends to speak of undercounting and overcounting as false negatives and 
false positives (Boersma and Willard 2008). 
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COVID-19 originated. While the Chinese government did announce that the 
coronavirus was spreading, there is considerable evidence that their reports 
downplayed the extent of the problem (Associated Press 2020; Bloomberg 2020; 
Davidson 2020). In addition, the World Health Organization seems to have 
uncritically accepted China’s reporting and delayed announcing that there was a 
“public health emergency of international concern” until January 30 (Feldwisch-
Drentrup 2020). Similarly, other authoritarian regimes have produced dubious 
reports (e.g., North Korea continued insisting it had no COVID-19 cases long 
after both China and South Korea acknowledged that the disease was in their 
countries) (Walsh 2020).  And, as weeks went by and the debate about rolling 
back social distancing became more intense, there were complaints that officials 
in some US states were defining cases in ways that would increase or decrease 
their numbers (Koerth 2020). 
One way to try to grasp the extent of undercounting is to compare the 
acknowledged COVID-19 death toll with the ordinary number of deaths in the 
same jurisdiction during the same time of year. Say that records show that a place 
routinely has around 500 deaths during the first week in April, and there were 
1,000 deaths that week during the spread of the virus; this suggests that COVID-
19 increased the death toll by 500 deaths. Once people began to examine such 
data, it became clear that the level of undercounting was significant (Giles 2020; 
Wu and McCann 2020; Wu et al. 2020). In some cases, there were efforts to 
correct the undercounts by retroactively reclassifying causes of death (Goodman 
and Rashbaum 2020). 
 
All Comparisons Involve Choices 
 
It is often hard to know what to make of a number. Is it large or small?  
Ordinarily, placing a figure in some interpretive context requires making some 
sort of comparison. In the case of COVID-19 numbers, three sorts of comparisons 
predominated: comparisons with other epidemics; comparisons across geographic 
units, such as countries, states, or cities; and comparisons with other causes of 
death. 
 
Comparisons with Other Epidemics 
 
Epidemic diseases are not uncommon. Just since the year 2000, Americans’ 
attention has been drawn to SARS (2003), H1N5 flu (2005), H1N1 flu (2009), 
West Nile virus (2012), MERS (2013), Ebola (2014), and Zika virus (2016) 
(David J. Sencer CDC Museum 2020). US media, particularly in the cases of 
H1N5 and Ebola, treated these as major threats (Best 2008). Dozens of other 
disease outbreaks occurred in other countries (World Health Organization 2020).  
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Yet, with the exception of the flu, which circulates in new variants each year, 
none of these epidemics claimed many lives in the US. 
The last major epidemic to cause widespread deaths in the U.S. was the so-
called Spanish flu of 1918–20 (Barry 2004). It killed more—perhaps hundreds of 
thousands more—than half a million people in the US, and over 100 million 
worldwide.  But of course, the medicine of 100 years ago was markedly less 
effective than it is today, so it is hard to compare the terrible devastation of the 
1918 pandemic with what is likely to happen with COVID-19. Similarly, it is 
always possible to go further back into the historical record, as I have done by 
making comparisons with Defoe’s account of the 1665 plague. History offers all 
manner of examples of terrible epidemics, such as the Black Death of the mid-
fourteenth century, but again, living conditions, transportation, and medicine were 
vastly different in earlier eras. It is hard to conclude much from these examples, 
except we may find comfort in the realization that, although modern 
transportation has enabled COVID-19 to span the globe with astonishing rapidity, 
it is unlikely to kill anything like the number of victims in earlier epidemics. 
 
Comparisons Across Geography 
 
Commentators on COVID-19 have made far more use of comparisons among 
countries, states, or cities, easily accomplished because the agencies that keep 
records on cases and deaths have responsibility for counting events in their 
jurisdictions, and researchers are almost certain to sample cases from particular 
places. In addition, public policies for dealing with COVID-19 usually involve 
government officials establishing rules for the areas they administer, and these 
rules often vary both in their timing (i.e., how soon the policies were implemented 
after the first local infections became known) and their stringency (i.e., both the 
policies’ range and their enforcement can vary).   
These various policies create what amount to natural experiments. If Location 
A took action early (by closing schools, businesses, etc.) while Location B took 
much longer to act, these differences might be expected to have effects on how 
widely COVID-19 could spread, how much difficulty hospitals would have 
dealing with the increase in patients, and the number of deaths in each location.  
Commentators devoted a good deal of attention to such comparisons. For 
instance, US state governors were praised or denounced for their actions (Scher 
2020). Similarly, some countries adopted stricter policies, sometimes much 
earlier in the disease outbreak. At least in the early weeks of the epidemic, taking 
action quickly seemed to be fairly effective in minimizing the spread of the 
disease (Glanz and Robertson 2020).  
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Comparisons with Other Causes of Death 
 
COVID-19 can be lethal, of course, and the media constantly updated death tolls.  
But how big a deal is COVID-19? After all, lots of people die every year. In 2017 
(the most recent year for which complete data are available), more than 2.8 
million people died in the US, and about 56 million worldwide (Kochanek et al. 
2019; Ritchie and Roser 2019). While I was drafting this paper, the global death 
toll surpassed 200,000, of which more than 50,000 were in the US—and of course 
those figures will have certainly increased by the time anyone reads this.  But do 
those death tolls suggest that COVID-19 is a big problem, or a relatively minor 
matter? 
While the alarming tone of media coverage might make it seem obvious that 
the coronavirus is a big deal, some commentators sought to downplay its large-
scale significance.  This was particularly true during February and early March, 
when the US death tolls were still very low, and there were even claims (not, to be 
sure, by medical authorities) that the final US death toll might be in the hundreds. 
Compared to the nearly three million deaths occurring each year in the US, a death 
toll of 50,000, or 100,000, or even 200,000 might be seen as a relatively small 
increase. After all, the flu kills tens of thousands of Americans each year, and 
traffic accidents nearly 40,000. While we encourage people to buckle up and get a 
flu shot, we see flu and traffic fatalities as ordinary, routine causes of death, 
inevitable costs of living a large, complex society. We don’t implement social 
isolation policies for the flu each year, so is it really necessary to take drastic 
measures to fight the apparently more-or-less equivalent threat of COVID-19? 
The answer, of course, is that the death toll during the first few weeks after 
the sudden onset of the coronavirus and the annual tallies for deaths attributed to 
flu or traffic fatalities are not really comparable (Faust 2020; Schulman et al. 
2020). Traffic fatalities are spread out over 52 weeks, averaging roughly 700 
deaths per week; after about only nine weeks, COVID-19 deaths far exceeded the 
annual traffic death toll. Once we compare death tolls from different causes for, 
say, a given week, the impact of the coronavrius becomes apparent: during the 
week of April 6–12, COVID-19 killed more Americans than cancer (usually the 
second leading cause of death), and nearly as many as heart disease. The threat 
varied from place to place: in New York, Louisiana, and Washington, D.C., 
COVID-19 was the leading cause of death for that week; it killed more than ten 
times as many people as heart disease in New York City (Keating and Esteban 
2020). 
The other feature of COVID-19’s spread is its dramatic increase in cases.  
While there may be minor season fluctuations, deaths from heart disease, cancer, 
and traffic accidents are spread more or less evenly across the year. In contrast, 
there were markedly more COVID-19 cases and deaths in each successive week 
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as the disease spread. The great danger, of course, was that serious cases would 
outpace the capacity of hospitals and medical professionals to provide the needed 
care. This process was slowed only with the implementation of social distancing 
measures. Moreover, until there is an effective vaccine for COVID-19, it is likely 
that, when social distancing is relaxed, there may be successive outbreaks that will 
require again tightening social distancing. 
In short, the dynamics of an epidemic make it very difficult to make 
comparisons with the usual causes of deaths. 
 
Social Patterns Shape Numbers 
 
Early discussions of COVID-19 tended to gloss over how the epidemic was 
shaped by social patterns, but by late April, a good deal of commentary focused 
on ethnic differences. That is, it became clear that African Americans and Latinos 
accounted for a much larger share of cases and deaths than their proportions in the 
population (Daniels and Morial 2020). This almost certainly had nothing to do 
with inter-group biological differences. Rather—as is so often the case—ethnicity 
served as a proxy for thinking about social class. Our readiness to focus on 
ethnicity—rather that class—reflects the presence of established groups of 
advocates committed to drawing attention to the inequities of ethnicity in our 
society, the terrible practical problems involved in measuring social class, and 
Americans’ distaste for talking about class and their casual acceptance of racial 
classifications.8   
Class is important because it shapes susceptibility to disease generally, and 
COVID-19 particularly. Those with higher incomes have better access to health 
care in the US, they have lower risks (e.g., they are less likely to smoke, and their 
work is less likely to expose them to health hazards), and as a result they have 
longer life expectancies. Those with lower incomes are more likely to have 
chronic health problems such as heart disease, lung disease, and diabetes that 
make them more vulnerable to COVID-19. They also tend to live and work in 
more crowded conditions that make social distancing more difficult. 
News coverage tends to draw attention to atypical cases, such as reports of 
celebrities sick with COVID-19, and it often treats infection as a purely biological 
process while ignoring its social context. But epidemics do not spread evenly 
through societies; they routinely disadvantage the poor (Hays 2009).  Defoe noted 
                                                          
8 This is, as an anonymous reviewer points out, a complicated issue. Both race and class are of 
course multi-faceted and socially constructed and have inspired vast social scientific literatures.  
My point—and here I agree with most COVID-19 commentators—is that the disadvantaged 
positions of ethnic minorities (their occupations, their residential areas, their access to medical 
services, and so on) are fundamentally about their place in the economic order, i.e., their class. 
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that the Londoners who could afford to do so tended to leave the city in 1665, just 
as contemporary observers warn that those who were most vulnerable when the 
COVID-19 epidemic began could be expected to bear a disproportionate share of 
the risks as society tried to relax social distancing measures (Lane 2020). Raw 
numbers, such as total cases or total deaths can obscure such social patterns. 
 
The Relevance of COVID-19 for Numeracy 
 
When advocates promote numeracy, they often emphasize the need for citizens to 
have a grasp of mathematics and statistics: 
 
Quantitatively literate citizens need to know more than formulas and equations. They 
need a predisposition to look at the world through mathematical eyes, to see the benefits 
(and risks) of thinking quantitatively about commonplace issues, and to approach 
complex problems with confidence in the value of careful reasoning  (Steen 2001).  
 
And yet, because many of those most concerned with numeracy or statistical 
literacy are mathematics or statistics educators, they tend to define innumeracy in 
terms of an inability either to understand mathematical concepts, or to apply what 
is learned in math classes to real-world problems. Thus, we are warned that many 
people, faced with the need to paint a room of known dimensions, and knowing 
how many square feet a gallon of paint should cover, still cannot figure out how 
much paint they need to buy to do the job.9 
COVID-19 clearly presents a major challenge to citizenship. It is important 
that people understand the scope and nature of the problem, and that they can use 
that knowledge to guide their behavior.  And just as in Defoe’s plague year, this 
knowledge involves trying to interpret numbers that reveal what’s going on. There 
is some evidence that some quantitative arguments have been fairly widely 
understood: the importance of “flattening the curve” has been repeated enough 
that opinion polls suggest that a substantial majority of the population supports 
the need for social distancing policies (Kirzinger et al. 2020). However, the 
discourse that surrounds this issue is confused because not everyone can agree on 
the facts. There are multiple contradictory rumors, and the nature of the most 
common indicators is not well understood.10 While some of these problems may 
                                                          
9 There are even more fundamental ways to misunderstand numbers. There are many different 
known coronaviruses. Some commentators—including a prominent conservative talk-radio 
personality and a member of the White House staff—misunderstood the label COVID-19 to mean 
that this was the 19th coronavirus to have been discovered and reasoned that, since the previous 
eighteen had no memorable impact, fears about COVID-19 must be exaggerated. Of course, the 
designation COVID-19 actually refers to the fact that the virus was identified in 2019. 
10 Rumors and other misinformation related to epidemics are common (Kitta 2019).  Defoe refers 
to rumors at several points. In particular, the claim that the COVID-19 virus had originated in a 
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involve some mathematical confusion, most of them also involve a fundamental 
failure to understand and appreciate how claims about COVID cases, COVID 
deaths, and so on are socially constructed. Teaching numeracy cannot be 
understood only as a mathematical project that can ignore the way numbers are 
brought into being. 
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